## Social Choice and Welfare

© Springer-Verlag 1990

## Contents

Austen-Smith D: Credible debate equilibria 75

Baigent N, Huang P: Topological social choice: reply to Le Breton and Uriarte 141

Bandyopadhyay T: Sequential path independence and social choice 209

Barberà S, Peleg B: Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences 31

Bordes G, Breton MLe: Arrovian Theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods 1

Bordes G, Breton MLe: Arrovian theorems for economic domains: assignments, matchings and pairings 193

Bossert W: Maximin welfare orderings with variable population size 39

Breton MLe → Bordes G 1

Breton MLe, Uriarte JR: On the robustness of the impossibility result in the topological approach to social choice 131

Breton MLe, Uriarte JR: Topological social choice: a rejoinder 147

Breton MLe → Bordes G 193

Bucovetsky S: Majority rule in multi-dimensional spatial models 353

Crown T: Distribution in fixed and variable number problems 47

Dutta B: On the tournament equilibrium set 381

Feld SL, Grofman B: A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions 71

Fishburn PC: Fair cost allocation schemes 57

Gap-Seon Hong → Palma A de 247 Glazer A, McMillan H: Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly 369 Grofman B → Feld SL 71

Gradstein M, Nitzan S: Binary participation and incremental provision of public goods 171

Huang P → Baigent N 141

Jung JP: Black and Farquharson on order-ofvoting effects: an extension 319

Koehler DH: The size of the yolk: computations for odd and even-numbered committees 231

McLean I: The Borda and Condorcet principles: three medieval applications 99

McMillan H → Glazer A 369

Moulin H: Fair division under joint ownership: recent results and open problems 149

Nitzan S → Gradstein M 171

Palma A de, Gap-Seon Hong, Thisse J-F: Equilibria in multi-party competition under uncertainty 247

Peleg B → Barberà S 31

Rothstein P: Order restricted preference and majority rule 331

Saari DG: The Borda dictionary 279

Schwartz T: Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: a solution 19

Scitovsky T: John Hicks · 1904—1989 97

Segerstrom PS: Moral efficiency. A new criterion for social choice 109

Shogren JF: On increased risc and the voluntary provision of public goods 221

Sosnowska H: A note on Mezetti's "Paretian efficiency, Rawlsian justice and the Nozick theory of rights" 261

Thisse J-F → Palma A de 247

Uriarte JR → Breton M Le 131 Uriarte JR → Breton M Le 147

Xu Y: The Libertarian paradox: some further observations 343

Indexed in Current Contents and Journal of Economic Literature